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RECENT CASES
AGENCY-INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR-"ONE WAY
LEASE" EFFECTIVE TO TERMINATE RELATIONSHIP
Defendant, an authorized common carrier of freight in interstate
commerce, rented a truck and driver to transport steel from Maryland
to Pennsylvania. This transaction was referred to as a "one way
lease,"' and under its terms the lease and the defendant-lessee's
liability were to terminate upon delivery of the cargo. Plaintiffs were
injured in a collision resulting from the negligent operation of the
truck as it returned empty from its destination. Plaintiffs sued the
carrier, basing their claim either on the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior2 or on the theory that if the owner-lessor was found to be an
independent contractor the obligations owed by defendant to the
public were non-delegable. At the trial defendant's motion for a sum-
mary judgment was granted on the ground that the truck was not
being operated for, on behalf of, or at the request of defendant at
the time of the accident. 3 On appeal, held, affirmed. The lease was
valid and its terms were controlling so that at the time of the accident
the truck was not being operated on behalf of defendant or under a
franchise which would place a non-delegable duty upon him.4 Hall
v. Gallagher, 125 A.2d 507 (Del. 1956).5
Under the broad principles of respondeat superior a master is sub-
ject to liability for injury caused by the negligent deeds of his servants
committed within the scope of their employment. 6 Furthermore, it
is a traditional rule of the common law that an employer of an
independent contractor ordinarily is not responsible for the latter's
1. See ICC v. Allen E. Kroblin Inc., 113 F. Supp. 599, 603 (N.D. Iowa 1953)
("trip leasing"); Note, Trip-Leasing Under the Motor Carrier Act, 34 B.U.L.
REV. 307, 310 (1954).
2. See Bates v. Kurtts, 36 Ala. App. 350, 55 So. 2d 864, 865 (1951); Midwest
Dairy Products Co. v. ESSO Standard Oil Co., 193 Tenn. 553, 246 S.W.2d 974,
975 (1952); FERSON, PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY § 25 (1954).
3. The question of agency is usually a question for the trier of fact. See
Venuto v. Robinson, 118 F.2d 679 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 627 (1941);
Cotton v. Ship-By-Truck Co., 337 Mo. 270, 85 S.W.2d 80 (1935); Kissell v.
Motor Age Transit Lines Inc., 357 Pa. 204, 53 A.2d 593 (1947); 2 Am. Jun.,
Agency § 454 (1936). But see Gallagher's Estate v. Battle, 122 A.2d 93 (Md.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 894 (1956).
4. Plaintiff relied on several factors in an effort to establish the existence
of a contract between defendant-carrier and owner-lessor covering the return
trip. They were: (a) a phone call from driver to defendant concerning the
possibility of an additional load on driver's return; (b) defendant's name and
permit number, as well as racks used to support steel in transit, on truck at
time of accident.
5. See also Gallagher's Estate v. Battle, 122 A.2d 93 (Md.) Cert. denied, 352
U.S. 894 (1956).
6. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 243 (1933); FERSON, op. cit. supra note 2.
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negligent torts.7 An exception to this rule has. been the liability im-
posed on those engaged in activity franchised by agencies of gov-
ernment involving special obligations which are owed to the public. 8
The duty to safeguard the public while performing such activities
is non-delegable and the franchise holder is therefore responsible
for the conduct of those whom it permits to act under its franchise.9
Such obligations were created by the Motor Carrier Act of 193510
which required the carrier to obtain a permit from the Interstate
Commerce Commission before operating in interstate commerce.'1
The initial question in cases involving an employer's liability for
his employee's torts is whether or not the relationship of master-
servant exists between the employer and employee so as to fix liability
upon the master under the doctrine of respondeat superior. In the
instant case the court held as a matter of law that such a relationship
did not exist. A more difficult question is whether liability is extended
to the employer under the exception to the independent contractor
rule. The essence of this question is whether the employer's liability
for the negligent performance of non-delegable duties can be con-
tracted away. In situations quite similar to the instant case, but not
involving a "one way lease," liability has been imposed upon the
employer.12 These decisions were based upon the reasoning that no
distinction should be made between the liability resulting from acci-
dents occurring on the outbound trip and those on the return trip,
as both legs are a necessary part of the whole trip.13 Had there been
no "one way lease" in the instant case, it is probable that a result in
accord with this reasoning would have been reached.
7. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAw OF AGENCY § 427 (1952); PROSSER, TORTS
§ 64 (2d ed. 1955).
8. War Emergency Co-op. Ass'n v. Widenhouse, 169 F.2d 403 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 898 (1948); Venuto v. Robinson, 118 F.2d 679 (3d. Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 627 (1941); Hodges v. Johnson, 52 F. Supp. 488 (W.D.
Va. 1943); Eli v. Murphy, 39 Cal. 2d 598, 248 P.2d 756 (1952); Erie R.R. v. Salis-bury, 66 N.J.L. 233, 50 Atl. 117 (1901); MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 7, § 485;
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 428 (1934).
9. The purpose underlying this exception seems to be to hold him respon-
sible who, for the purpose of carrying out the franchised activity, has placed
the tortfeasor in a position to cause injury to members of the public. See
War Emergency Co-op. Ass'n v. Widenhouse, supra note 8; Zimmerman v.
Mathews Trucking Corp., 105 F. Supp. 57 (W.D. Ark. 1952) (dictum), rev'd on
other grounds, 203 F.2d 864 modified on rehearing 205 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1953);
Hodges v. Johnson, supra note 8.
10. 49 STAT. 543 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-27 (Supp. 1956).
One purpose of this act was to promote public safety through the regulation
of qualifications and hours of service of employees and safety of equipment
and operation. See Note, Trip-Leasing Under the Motor Carrier Act, supra
note 1.
11. See Note, Trip-Leasing Under the Motor Carrier Act, supra note 1, at 308.
12. Hodges v. Johnson, 52 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Va. 1943); Lehman v. Robert-
son Truck-A-Way, 122 Cal. App. 2d 82, 264 P.2d 653 (1953); Cotton v. Ship-
By-Truck Co., 337 Mo. 270, 85 S.W.2d 80 (1935). See also Eckard v. Johnson,
235 N.C. 538, 70 S.E.2d 488 (1952) (dictum).
13. Hodges v. Johnson, supra note 12.
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The decision in the instant case was based upon Costello v. Smith1 4
which involved a "one way lease" and in which the employer escaped
liability upon the theory that the responsibility for providing regula-
tions necessary to protect the safety of the public rests upon the
Interstate Commerce Commission. The court reasoned that the ab-
sence of a regulation pertaining to "one way leases" was in itself a
"regulation" not to be contradicted by judicial decision. The lease,
therefore, was treated as if it were expressly permitted by the Commis-
sion, and its terms were said to control the existence of the employee's
activity under the franchise.
The correctness of this reasoning is dubious. In 1950, the Interstate
Commerce Commission issued a regulation authorizing the interchange
of equipment among carriers by contract or lease.'5 The operation
of this ruling was contested, however, and its effective date postponed
indefinitely.16 At the time of the Costello case the only permission
granted by the Commission with regard to such leases was a permis-
sion possibly inferrable from the Commission's silence. If in deciding
the Costello case the court had been concerned only with "judge made
law," the employer might have been held accountable. 17 Instead,
the court relied on the Commission's failure to regulate and thus
decided that the effect of this silence was to pre-empt the field. If
Congress, through the Interstate Commerce Commission, had affirm-
atively taken over the courts' authority to act in this area by providing
regulations expressly authorizing the use of "one way leases," the
decisions in the Costello case, the instant case and its companion case18
would appear unassailable. Since the Commission had neither author-
ized nor forbidden the use of such leases but had merely remained
silent, it did not necessarily follow that the courts should have been
precluded from holding the lease ineffectual to destroy the employer's
common law non-delegable obligations. The result reached in these
three cases may be desirable, however, as it tends to prevent the un-
reasonable extension of liability arising from a relationship which is
originally consensual,19 but the rationale used to arrive at this end
appears questionable.
14. 179 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1950).
15. 15 Fed. Reg. 4338 (1950).
16. Id. at 6125. For the present status of a "trip lease," see 49 C.F.R. §§
207.1-.6 (Supp. 1956) (lease and interchange of vehicles), as modified by
70 STAT. 958, 983 (1956), 49 U.S.C.A. § 304 (Supp. 1956), amending 49 STAT.
543 (1935).
17. The duty to safeguard the public while performing under such a fran-
chise is non-delegable and the franchise holder is therefore responsible for
the conduct of those whom it permits to act under its franchise. See Hodges
v. Johnson, 52 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Va. 1943); Eli v. Murphy, 39 Cal. 2d 598,
248 P.2d 756 (1952).
18. Gallagher's Estate v. Battle, 122 A.2d 93 (Md. 1956).
19. See Eckhard v. Johnson, 235 N.C. 538, 70 S.E.2d 488 (1952).
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COURTS-CIVIL RIGHTS ACT-IMMUNITY OF
JUDGE FOR ACTS COMMITTED IN THE EXERCISE
OF A JUDICIAL FUNCTION
Judgments were rendered against the plaintiff in two proceedings
in the state courts of Kentucky. On appeal both judgments were
affirmed. Thereupon plaintiff brought an action for damages in
federal court under the Civil Rights Act,1 naming as defendants, among
others, the trial and appellate judges in the state litigation. The com-
plaint alleged that the state court judgments were rendered against
plaintiff through the arbitrary and capricious exercise of judicial
power on the part of said defendants, thereby depriving plaintiff of
due process and equal protection of the laws. Held, complaint dis-
missed. The Civil Rights Act does not impose liability upon judges
for acts, however arbitrary or capricious, committed in the exercise
of a judicial function. Grubbs v. Slater, 144 F. Supp. 554 (W.D. Ky.
1955) ,2 affd per curiam, 234 F.2d 666 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
894 (1956).
The question of whether the broad language of the Civil Rights
Act 3 abrogates the historic doctrine of judicial immunity4 has been
a recurring subject of litigation in the lower federal courts.5 The
vast majority of the courts have preserved the immunity doctrine and
held that the act cannot be applied to a judge in a suit for damages.6
These decisions, though apparently contrary to the statutory language,
are based on very strong public policy considerations calling for an
1. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 241-44 (1950); REV. STAT. §§ 1977-91, 5506-32 (1875), 42
US.C.A. §§ 1981-94 (Supp. 1956); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (Supp. 1956) (conferring
jurisdiction on federal courts in civil rights actions).
2. This case was decided in July 1955, but was not reported until Novem-
ber 1956.
3. The specific provision invoked in the instant case provides as follows:
'Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." REv. STAT.
§ 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Supp. 1956). For an excellent discussion
of the confusion which this legislation has engendered in the courts, see
Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 Mcn. L. REV.
1323 (1952).
4. Though Congress expressed no intention on the point it has been ob-
served that it probably intended to destroy governmental immunities in suits
brought under the act. See Note, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1296 n.56 (1953). For
a discussion of the status of immunities under the act, see Jennings, Tort Liabil-
ity of Administrative Officers, 21 M1_x. L. REV. 263 (1937); Note, 68 HARv. L.
REV. 1229 (1955).
5. During the period 1951-54, 32 cases were reported in which damages were
sought against state officials under the act. In 5 of these cases the complaints
were upheld, dismissals were granted in 27, 12 of the latter being based ex-
plicitly on immunity, at least in part.
6. See, e.g., REV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 n.50 (Supp. 1956);
Kenney v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1956); Francis v. Crafts, 203 F.2d 809
(1st Cir. 1953); Souther v. Reid, 101 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Va. 1951).
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independent judiciary.7 Only two lower court decisions have allowed
recovery against a Judge under the statute for acts committed in the
exercise of his judicial function.8 In spite of the apparent conflict and
confusion in the circuits on this question, the Supreme Court has re-
peatedly denied certiorari in cases involving the effect of the Civil
Rights Act on judicial immunity.9
The instant case arose in a circuit which, in the case of McShane v.
Moldovan,0 had apparently held that congress intended by the act to
destroy governmental immunities." The court in the instant case,
after discussing and endorsing the doctrine of absolute immunity,
distinguished the McShane decision on the ground that it arose out
of a criminal prosecution to which the state was a party, whereas the
instant case arose from litigation involving only private parties.12
This explanation seems far from satisfactory, since it is the judge's
office which would make the act applicable, if at all, and not the
7. Among the arguments advanced in support of immunity are the follow-
ing: (1) the saving to the public of the drain upon judicial time that would
otherwise be spent in defense of private litigation; (2) the prevention of
undue influence upon judicial determination through the threat or even the
possibility of damage suits based thereon; (3) the fear that men of property
and responsibility might be deterred from judicial service; (4) the special
importance of an independent judiciary; (5) the need for absolute finality in
the litigation of controversies; (6) the feeling that it would be manifestly
unfair for the law to place one in a position, the very significance of which
is to require his opinion on an important matter, and then penalize him for it.
8. McShane v. Moldovan, 172 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1949); Picking v. Penn-
sylvania Ry., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945). The breach in the doctrine
of judicial immunity represented by these two decisions stems largely from
the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941)
in which election officials were indicted for depriving a citizen of the right
to vote through the misuse of power. In this case the Court said, "misuse of
power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under
color of' state law [as that phrase is used in the Civil Rights Act]." United
States v. Classic, supra at 326. The Picking case and the McShane case were
decided, however, without benefit of the illumination found in the Supreme
Court opinion in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) discussed in note
9 infra.
9. See, e.g., Bottone v. Lindsley, 170 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1948); Picking v.
Pennsylvania Ry. 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945). The Supreme Court opinion
in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871) is constantly cited
by the lower federal courts in support of judicial immunity in suits brought
under the act. It should be pointed out that in the Bradley case the Court
had no occassion to construe the section of the act under which these later
cases were brought. Although this section had been passed by Congress some
8 months before the Bradley case was decided, it could not be given retro-
active effect so as to apply to the facts of the case. Also, the Supreme Court's
decision in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) granting immunity to
state legislators has been repeatedly used as authority for judicial immunity.
See, e.g., Kenney v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288, 293 (1956).
10. 172 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1949).
11. The court in the McShane case, quoting with approval from Picking v.
Pennsylvania Ry., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), said, "Congress gave a
right of action sounding in tort to every individual whose federal rights were
trespassed upon by any officer acting under pretense of state law." 172 F.2d
at 1022.
12. 144 F. Supp. at 564.
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nature of the suit or the character of the parties.13 It would seem a
strange theory indeed to grant absolute immunity to a judge in a
suit between private litigants, but to impose liability upon him if
the suit happened to involve the state as a party. Certainly the
policy arguments in favor of immunity apply as strongly in the latter
situation. Indeed, in the case of Kenney v. Fox14 the court of ap-
peals which affirmed the decision in the instant case was faced with
this very issue. This case arose from a lunacy proceeding in which
the plaintiff had been committed to a mental institution. He later
brought an action under the Civil Rights Act for damages against
the judge in the lunacy proceeding. This was not, of course, a suit
arising from litigation involving only private parties. Nevertheless
the court applied the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. As a re-
sult of the decisions in the instant case and the Kenney case, the
McShane holding has been largely vitiated.
As the confusion in the sixth circuit illustrates, the problem raised
in these cases is a perplexing one. The courts seem to be frustrating
the declared purposes of Congress in the field of federal enforcement
of constitutional rights. It has been suggested that perhaps a com-
plete frustration of those purposes is not necessary, and that perhaps
the judicial process is capable of affording a plaintiff who has a solid
claim of malice an opportunity to prove it, while at the same time
protecting the defendant officers from undue harrassment from plain-
tiffs who do not.'5 At any rate, on a question so fundamental and
so frequently recurring, it seems that the Supreme Court should have
made a more definitive statement.
COURTS-CONTEMPT-VIOLATION OF COURT RULE
BANNING PHOTOGRAPHY
Photographs of a convicted murderer' were taken outside the
entrance to the courtroom2 by means of infra red rays requiring no
flashbulbs and causing no commotion or noise. The photographers
13. The court, in effect, admitted this when it said, "the two due process
clauses afford protection . . . against governmental activity through some
governmental agency . . . ." Id. at 562. That a state "acts" through its
judiciary in litigation between private parties cannot be doubted. Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
14. 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1956).
15. HART AND WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
1216 (1953).
1. The trial of this prisoner, who was known as the "Turnpike Killer,"
was the object of -intense and widespread interest in Pennsylvania. The dis-
sent by Justice Musmanno in the instant case contains a detailed account of
the circumstances of that case. 126 A.2d at 690.
2. Another picture was taken on the first floor of the courthouse after the
sentencing. The court room is on the fourth floor of the building.
1957 ]
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and other members of the press were found guilty of contempt for
violation of a rule of court 3 prohibiting the taking of photographs
within forty feet of the entrance to a courtroom, and also forbidding
pictures to be taken of any prisoner in jail or on his way to a session of
court. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, this rule was
assailed by defendants as an unreasonable restraint upon the freedom
of the press and an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Held, convic-
tions affirmed. The rule is a valid exercise of the trial court's power
to preserve decorum and to protect the prisoner's right of privacy.
In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956).
Courts have inherent power to make reasonable rules for the
orderly administration of justice,4 and rules banning the taking of
photographs in or close to the courtroom are not unusual. The Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibit the taking of photographs
in a courtroom.5 Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics of the
American Bar Association 6 contains a similar provision, based on the
assumption that the taking of photographs is calculated to detract
from the essential dignity of the proceedings.7 Newspapermen have
no immunity from application of these rules, since freedom of the
press may be restricted when its exercise constitutes a clear and
present danger to the judicial procedure.8 A newspaper publication
may constitute contempt of court and is punishable as such.9
Though rules banning photography in courtrooms are common,
few reported cases concerning their validity can be found. In the
case of Ex parte Sturm,0 the contempt conviction of a newspaper
photographer who took pictures at a trial without the judge's knowl-
edge was upheld chiefly on the basis of protecting the accused. The
constitutional requirement of a public trial was regarded as for the
benefit of the accused, rather than the press, and the latter's freedom
was held to be limited by the court's freedom. A New York trial
court, in the case of In re Seed," mentioned the noise and commotion
3. "'(a) No pictures or photographs shall be taken, immediately preceding
or during sessions of this court or recesses between sessions, in any of the
court rooms or at any place in the court house within forty feet of the en-
trance to any court room.
1(d) No prisoner or inmate of the county jail shall be photographed in the
jail or on his way to or from a session of court.'" 126 A.2d at 680.
4. In re Lee, 170 Md. 43, 183 Atl. 560 (1936); Equipment Corp. v. Primos
Vanadium Co., 285 Pa. 432, 132 Atl. 360 (1926).
5. Fw. R. CRim. P. 53.
6. See 126 A.2d at 681.
7. For a vehement attack on this canon and the assumption which under-
lies it, see Hanson, Canon 35-Press, Radio and Television Coverage of the
Courts, 16 ALA. LAW. 248 (1955).
8. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
9. Dale v. State, 198 Ind. 110, 150 N.E. 781 (1926). See also Comment, The
Suppression of Radio and Newspaper Comment on Pending Criminal Trials,
40 J. Caim. L., C. & P.S. 50 (1949).
10. 152 Md. 114, 136 Atl. 312 (1927).
11. 140 Misc. 681, 251 N.Y. Supp. 615 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
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caused by the old fashioned flares used for flash pictures as the reason
for banning courtroom photography. The more recent Ohio case of
State v. Clifford12 upheld a contempt conviction where flashbulb pic-
tures were taken while the court was actually in session. -The court
firmly rejected the photographer's protestation that the disturbance
was only momentary.
The court rule involved in the instant case was found to be valid
because it bore a reasonable relation to the maintenance of the dignity
of the court and the orderly administration of justice.13 The court's
fear of permitting sensational journalism to cater to a supposedly
morbid public curiosity is also apparent. 4 Additional support for the
holding was found in the need for the court to protect the right of
privacy of defendants in criminal cases,15 although the court did not
deny that this prisoner had become a "public figure" and a legitimate
subject of newspaper comment. The concurring opinion differs sharply
with the majority on the issue of the right of privacy 6 of a defendant
in a criminal trial, and states that such a person is "subject t6 being
photographed ... on a proper occasion and for a proper purpose."'17
The right of a court to take whatever measures are necessary in
order to preserve order and assure that the proceedings are fair
cannot be questioned. The taking of flash-pictures in a courtroom
and the moving about of photographers would undoubtedly disrupt
the trial. However, the need for the broad rule enforced in the instant
case may be less acute in view of modern developments in the field
of photography. The Supreme Court of Colorado, in adopting the re-
port of a referee appointed to conduct hearings concerning Canon 35
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, has retreated from the strict ban on
courtroom photography imposed by this canon.18 Such activity may
still be prohibited by the trial court if the particular circumstances
of a ease indicate that it would interfere with the conduct of the busi-
ness of the court or compromise the dignity of the proceedings. Now,
however, a trial court in that state may not only permit the taking
of still photographs, but may also allow motion picture, radio and
television coverage of court proceedings. Improvements in photo-
graphic techniques, and a desire to increase the public's familiarity
12. 162 Ohio St. 370, 123 N.E.2d 8 (1954).
13. 126 A.2d at 682.
14. Ibid.
15. Id. at 683.
16. For a pioneering discussion of this right, see Warren and Brandeis,
The Right To Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
17. 126 A.2d at 686. Justice Bell would reverse the conviction of the
photographer who took the picture on the first floor of the courthouse, since
protection of the prisoner's right of privacy was the only basis supporting
the general rule against photographing prisoners. Id. at 686-87.
18. In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics,
296 P.2d 465 (1956).
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with the judicial function in government 19 motivated the change in
the attitude of the Colorado court. In addition, the right of privacy
was said not to exist "in connection with that which is inherently a
public matter."20
It cannot be denied that technical progress has obviated one reason
for the rule against photography.21 Yet, it is possible that a relaxation
of the sweeping ban enforced in the instant case may lead to abuse
by judges seeking public favor, at the expense of the privacy of jurors,
witnesses, and accused persons, thus increasing the natural reluctance
of jurors and witnesses to participate in trials.
CRIMINAL LAW-ENTRAPMENT BY STATE OFFICIAL AS A
DEFENSE TO FEDERAL PROSECUTION
One of three defendants indicted for conspiracy to violate federal
laws relating to distilling non-taxpaid whiskey alleged that he had
been entrapped by a state official. The trial court refused to charge
the jury on entrapment.' On appeal to the court of appeals, held,
19. "It is highly inconsistent to complain of the ignorance and apathy of
voters and then to 'close the windows of information through which they
might observe and learn.' . . .What harm could result from portraying by
photo, film, radio and screen to the business, professional and rural leader-
ship of a community, as well as to the average citizen regularly employed,
the true picture of the administration of justice?" Id. at 469.
20. Id. at 470. See also Garner v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 97 F. Supp
546 (1951); Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., '79 F. Supp. 957 (1948).
21. See 16 Orno ST. L.J. 274, 276 (1955), for the expression of a similar
thought.
1. The trial court's refusal was based on the grounds that the plea of en-
trapment was inconsistent with appellant's denial that he was a party to
the conspiracy. The court of appeals recognized that the trial court may
have been relying upon its language in Hamilton v. United States, 221 F.2d
611, 614 (5th Cir. 1955) where it said, "Entrapment is a valid, positive defense,
in certain circumstances, the invocation of which necessarily assumes that the
act charged was committed." The court of appeals first decided that de-
fendant's claim of entrapment was not sufficiently repugnant to his denial
of the conspiracy to warrant the refusal to charge on entrapment and then
considered whether the denial was nevertheless proper because the entrap-
ping officer was a state officer not acting in cooperation with any federal
authorities.
' There is much conflict in the decisions and inconsistency in the reasons
for the decisions in entrapment cases. These begin with the procedure by
which the defense should be presented. The confusion is the result of a
difference of theory on which the defense is based. Some courts hold that
entrapment is a defense only when, and because, it proves that the defendant
was not guilty of the offense charged; hence the defense may be raised by a
plea of not guilty. Others hold that the defense may be raised by a motion
to quash the indictment, by a plea in bar, or that the court itself of its own
motion may, and indeed should, where entrapment exists, stop the prosecution
and set the defendant at liberty, or free him under a writ of habeas corpus."
Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REV.,
245, 247 (1942). See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), where the
majority opinion subscribes to the "not guilty" procedure and the concurring
opinion contends that the indictment should be quashed by the court. See
also Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 421 (1928) (dissent of Brandeis, J.);
United States v. Lynch, 256 Fed. 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
[ VOL. 10
1957] RECENT CASES 609
reversed. Entrapment by a state official is a defense to a federal prose-
cution and the jury should be so charged. Henderson v. United States,
237 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956).
"Entrapment" is the inducement of one to commit a criminal act
for the purpose of instituting prosecution against him.2 Where the
doctrine of entrapment is recognized,3 the entrapped person will not
be held criminally responsible for his offence,4 but courts have never
agreed upon the underlying reason for this result. The disagreement
was brought into sharp focus by the Supreme Court in Sorrells v.
United States,5 in which the Court held that an entrapped person was
not guilty because an offense induced by officers is beyond the scope
of the controlling statute.6 The concurring Justices argued that en-
trapment by officers gave no claim to innocence but that the courts
were required by public policy to stop the prosecution in order to
protect the purity of the government and its processes.7 Thus, as
2. State v. Jarvis, 105 W.Va. 499, 143 S.E. 235 (1928). Entrapment as dis-
cussed here should be distinguished from offenses in which the absence of
consent is an element of the crime, as in burglary, robbery, etc. There
the efforts of the owner to ensnare the culprit may constitute consent so as
to preclude the crime. Consent cases are discussed in Annot., 18 A.L.R. 146,
149 (1922). For a case where the principle of consent is confused with that
of entrapment, see People v. Mills, 178 N.Y. 274, 70 N.E. 786 (1904).
3. The doctrine of entrapment is not recognized in New York. Kilen v.
Schacher, 47 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1944) nor in Tennessee. Thomas v. State, 182 Tenn.
380, 187 S.W.2d 529 (1945) (sale of intoxicating liquor to officer). However,
in all the Tennessee cases found by the writer the facts were not such as to
constitute a valid defense of entrapment even if the defense had been rec-
ognized. See Gosset v. Gosset, 34 Tenn. App. 654, 241 S.W.2d 934 (W.S. 1951)
(involved "clean hands" rather than entrapment); Goins v. State, 192 Tenn.
32, 237 S.W.2d 8 (1950) (illegal entry, merely question of consent); Palmer v.
State, 187 Tenn. 527, 216 S.W.2d 25 (1948) (sale of whiskey to officer);
Hyde v. State, 131 Tenn. 208, 174 S.W. 1127 (1914) (sale of morphine to state
detective).
4. "If an officer or some one acting under his direction induces or persuades
a person to commit a crime which he would not have committed without such
inducement, the law will not punish the person thus lured into commission
of the offense." People v. Lee, 9 Cal. App. 2d 99, 48 P.2d 1003, 1007 (1935).
"But it does not follow that the court must suffer a detective-made criminal
to be punished." Casey v. United States,. 276 U.S. 413, 421, 423 (1928) (dissent
of Brandeis, J.).
5. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). For a discussion of this case see Mikell, supra note 1.
This case squarely presented the question of entrapment by federal officials
to the Supreme Court for the first time although Justice Brandeis had pre-
viously urged its application in a vigorous dissent in Casey v. United States,
276 U.S. 413, 421 (1928).
6. The court's opinion was written by Chief Justice Hughes. Since it treated
entrapment as a jury issue there arises a question as to the method of proof.
As a result of this opinion the second circuit found in United States v. Sher-
man, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952), that "in such cases two questions of
fact arise: (1) did the agent induce the accused to commit the offense charged
in the indictment; (2) if so, was the accused ready and willing without persua-
sion and was he awaiting any propitious opportunity to commit the offense.
On the first question the accused has the burden; on the second the prosecution
has it." This analysis was approved in United States v. Masciale, 236 F.2d 601
(2d Cir. 1956).
For a very early case discussing entrapment under the theory of statutory
implication, see O'Brien v. State, 6 Tex. Crim. 665 (1879).
7. The basis of the concurring opinion may be one of estoppel applied
against the government. This tends to treat the issue as if it were between
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Judge Learned Hand has observed, the outlines of the concept are
nebulous and the plentiful decisions present no definite doctrine.8
Basically the problem involves the degree to which the government
should permit enticement into crime to be used as a device for testing
its citizens.
The doctrine has found two general applications: (1) where the
crime is one of absolute prohibition, e.g., selling intoxicants to a given
class of persons such as Indians or minors, and the offender has been
tricked or decoyed into the crime by a stratagem which makes the
act appear innocent; 9 and (2) where a criminal design is planted in
the mind of an innocent person 0 by the originator who induces him
-knowingly to commit the offense for the sole purpose of having him
prosecuted.' This does not mean that the defense is always available
private parties. See O'Brien v. United States, 51 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1931);
Voves v. United States, 249 Fed. 191 (7th Cir. 1918). On the other hand, the
theory may be that the court as a part of the government must protect its
own dignity and preserve among the citizens a confidence in the fairness of
the governmental process; and, when one becomes an offender because of
reprehensible methods of those acting under color of government authority,
the government acting through the courts must disapprove of and disassociate
itself from such methods even though this requires freeing the guilty offender.
8. United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933). "[W]e have been
unable to extract from [the plentiful decisions on entrapment] any definite
doctrine, and it seems unprofitable once more merely to catalogue the cita-
tions." Id. at 1009. State and federal cases prior to 1931 are catalogued in a
note to O'Brien v. State, 51 F.2d 674, 678 (7th Cir. 1931). See Comment, 9
Sw. L.J. 456, 465 (1955) for a state by state survey of the more recent state
cases.
9. "Decoys are permissible to entrap criminals, but not to create them ...
United States v. Healy, 202 Fed. 349, 350 (D. Mont. 1913) (officials caused pur-
chase of liquor from accused by an Indian who looked like a Caucasian);
Voves v. United States, 249 Fed. 191 (7th Cir. 1918) (Indian decoy looked
like a Mexican).
10. This term, so loosely used by the courts, means that the accused shall
not have had a general pre-existing intent to violate the law applicable to the
offense. No satisfactory criterion has been devised for determining when the
subject was "otherwise innocent." In United States v. Certain Quantities of
Intoxicating Liquor, 290 Fed. 824, 826 (D.C.N.H. 1923), it was said that "one
of two conditions must be present to warrant a conviction in this class of
cases-either (1) reasonable suspicion on the part of the officers that the party
is engaged in the commission of a crime or is about to do so; or (2) the
original suggestion or initiative must have come from the perpetrator." This
type of reasoning was harshly criticized in United States v. Washington, 20
F.2d 160 (D. Neb. 1927). "Neither suspicion nor honest belief that defendant
committed other offenses at other times has any place in the inquiry." Id. at
162. But the majority of the courts, despite hearsay objections, permit intro-
duction of collateral evidence of reputation, prior conviction and other indicia
of previous criminal intent on the part of the accused. See Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932); United States v. Masciale, 236 F.2d 601 (2d
Cir. 1956); United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1952); Silk v.
United States, 16 F.2d 568 (8th Cir. 1926) (reputation as a bootlegger). See
also Corcoran v. United States, 19 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1927), where the court
held that because evidence of complaints that defendant was bootlegging was
excluded upon defendant's objection, the court properly refused to allow
him to raise the question of entrapment. For interesting discussions on this
aspect of entrapment, see Mikell, supra note 1; Notes, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1067
(1928); 44 HARv. L. REV. 109 (1930).
11. "[W]e do not wish to commit ourselves to the doctrine that mere
readiness is enough, in spite of some of our language in U.S. v. Reisenweber
(C.C.A.) 288 F. 520.... The whole doctrine derives from a spontaneous moral
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when the proposal to commit the offense originates with the entrap-
ping person. Courts attempt to distinguish between what should be
considered mere detection and what should, be considered instigation.
For example, a decoy letter posted by a government agent requesting
the recipient to send obscene matter through the mails was held to be
mere detection,12 but an offer by an agent to buy a misbranded article
which was sent through the mails was held, upon a showing that the
agent had no reason to believe defendant had made prior shipments,
to be instigation.13 The question of what advances are permissible
varies with the circumstances of the accused and of the entrapping
person.14
Another question-who may entrap?-has rarely been a vital issue
in cases before the appellate courts.15 Generally it is said that where
the entrapping person was not acting under the color of official
revulsion against using the powers of government to beguile innocent, though
ductile, persons into lapses which they might otherwise resist. Such an emo-
tion is out of place if they are already embarked in conduct morally indis-
tinguishable, and of the same kind." United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007,
1009 (2d Cir. 1933).
12. Price v. United States, 165 U.S. 311 (1897); Grimm v. United States,
156 U.S. 604 (1895).
13. United States v. Eman Mfg. Co., 271 Fed. 353 (D. Colo. 1920).
14. For instance, an offer to bribe a customs official who was not reasonably
suspected of having previously accepted bribes was considered permissible
conduct of the inducing officers in Scriber v. United States, 4 F.2d 97 (6th Cir.
1925); but a similar attempt to induce a private citizen to offer a bribe was
held to be entrapment in United States ex rel. Hassel v. Mathues, 22 F.2d 979
(E.D. Pa. 1927).
One writer has suggested that "whether or not an advance should receive
judicial approval should depend upon the answers to the following queries:
(1) are such violations so frequently committed that a special effort must
be made to stamp them out? (2) is the crime so repugnant to decency or
so serious in its consequences that a government is justified in testing its
citizens? (3) is the offense so shrouded in secrecy that evidence is extremely
difficult to secure in any other way? (4) is the conduct of the officer of
such a nature that only a confirmed violator, and not an innocent person,
would be tempted?" Note, 28 CoLum. L. REv. 1067, 1072 (1928).
In Di Salvo v. United States, 2 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1924), the court dis-
approved, on the grounds that it had prejudicial connotations, an interesting
charge by the lower court wherein the judge had sought to distinguish be-
tween merely affording an opportunity to commit a crime and actually
instigating it by relating the story of Judas' betrayal of Jesus of Nazareth.
15. Generally the cases involve either regular officers of the prosecuting
government or persons acting under their direction or control. See, e.g.,
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) (federal prohibition agent
induced accused to procure and sell him whiskey by appealing to fact that
both had served in same army division); United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d
880 (2d Cir. 1952) (drug addict induced to obtain heroin for decoy employed
by federal agents whom he had come to know while seeking a cure for his
addiction); Butts v. United States, 273 Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1921) (internal rev-
enue agents used friend of accused, who knew he had become addicted to
dope from longstanding disease, to play on his sympathies and persuade him
to obtain dope although he had never before committed the offense); State
v. McCornish, 59 Utah 58, 201 Pac. 637 (1921) (city police detective induced
bell boy to procure female person for immoral purposes); State v. Mantis,
32 Idaho 724, 187 Pac. 268 (1920) (person whom accused desired to marry,
acting under instructions of the sheriff, caused accused to attempt act of
inducing a female to reside with him for immoral purposes by saying she did
not believe in marriage but believed in free love).
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authority, the doctrine has no application,16 but language has been
used to the effect that the defense can arise from acts of agents of
citizens' leagues or of independent protective associations.'7 Appar-
ently, the instant case is the first involving the defense of entrapment
by a state officer in a federal prosecution.18
Whether the instant decision represents an extension of the doc-
trine of entrapment beyond its prior limits or is merely an applica-
tion of the existing doctrine to new facts is difficult to determine.
If the true basis of entrapment is a form of estoppel,'9 then to hold
that the federal government can be estopped by independent acts
of state officers would seem to be an extension. If, however, the basis
is the duty of the courts to protect the purity of the government and
its processes in the eyes of its citizens,20 the holding is merely an appli-
cation of the pre-existing doctrine to a new situation. Finally, if the
issue is whether Congress intended the statute to apply to persons in-
duced by state officials, there is no extension of the doctrine but
16. "[A]t the very foundation of the defense of entrapment is the necessary
assumption that . . . [the officers] were all the time acting in their official
capacity. The government is not bound by acts of persons who never have
been, or in fact have ceased to be, its agents. And whether the doctrine of
entrapment is made to rest upon the theory of estoppel, or upon considerations
of public policy, or upon some other ground, it can be invoked only where the
government is, through its officers or agents, chargeable with inducing the
commission of the offense." Newman v. United States, 28 F.2d 681, 682 (9th
Cir. 1928), cert. denied, Boyd v. United States, 279 U.S. 839 (1929). "It
is not entrapment that one has been induced by some other than a person act-
ing for the government . . . ." Polski v. United States, 33 F.2d 686, 687 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 591 (1929) (inducement by a mere applicant for
position of prohibition agent who was not shown to be acting for the govern-
ment). This language was quoted with approval in Beard v. United States,
59 F.2d 940, 941 (8th Cir. 1932) (citizen, not an agent of the government,
informed officers after inducing defendant to make sale of liquor to a "friend'
but before the sale was made).
Where a "stool pigeon" made attempts to buy morphine both before and
after his employment by government inspectors, the question of entrapment
depended upon whether the criminal intent of the accused arose after the
employment. Cermack v. United States, 4 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1925). In Woo
Wai v. United States, 223 Fed. 412 (9th Cir. 1915), a new trial was ordered
for one entrapped by a private detective paid by the government. See also
Ivy v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 371, 277 S.W.2d 712 (1955) (semble) (entrapper
must be the state officer himself).
17. People v. Lewis, 365 Ill. 156, 6 N.E.2d 175 (1936) (inducement of ticket
agent by agent of railway protective association); Rider v. State, 53 Okla.
Crim. 389, 12 P.2d 552 (1932) (inducement by citizens acting independently
,of officials); Shouquette v. State, 25 Okla. Crim. 169, 219 Pac. 727 (1923) (in-
ducement by private detective of independent bankers' association); State v.
Feldman, 150 Mo. App. 120, 129 S.W. 998, 1000 (1910) (concurring opinion
placed instigation by detective of anti-saloon league within the doctrine of
entrapment). See also Note, 38 DICK. L. REv. 191, 194-96 (1934), especially
the discussion of Commonwealth v. Brown, 54 Pa. Super. 439 (1913), in which
-the court approved a charge to the effect that entrapment, if shown, was a
good defense, even though the entrapping persons were private citizens.
18. In O'Brien v. United States, 51 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1931), entrapment
was recognized as a good defense where the entrapping person was an ex-
bootlegger decoy loaned to the federal agents by state officials of Indiana.




merely a determination of legislative intent.21 In reaching its conclu-
sion, the court recognized the apparent analogy to the unreasonable
search and seizure cases wherein evidence illegally obtained by state
officials is held admissible in federal courts. 22 At the same time, it
recognized that there is a fundamental distinction. The illegal searches
and seizures involve acts of government agents done independently
of an alleged previously committed offense, whereas acts of entrap-
ment are the very fountainhead of the crime charged against the de-
fendant.P This distinction, considered in the light of the cooperative
concept of our federal system, wherein state officials are sworn to
uphold the Constitution of the United States and in reality work in
concert with federal officers, led the court to conclude that the policy
of the doctrine is sufficiently broad to include acts of inducement on
the part of all officers of the law notwithstanding the fact that state
officials cannot technically be termed agents of the federal govern-
ment.2
In principle at least, the decision is sound. It is well adapted to
promoting among the citizenry a confident respect for the ability of
the government to regulate fairly the affairs of our society and to
protect itself from abuse of its processes.
DAMAGES-BREACH OF WARRANTY-RECOVERY FOR
LOSS OF PROFITS
Plaintiff brought an action for breach of warranty alleging that a
certain marine engine purchased from defendant was not new as
represented, but was in fact used and of inferior quality. The jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff which represented the cost of
repairs plus the loss of profits caused by the breach. Defendant moved
21. See note 6 supra.
22. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Gambino v. United
States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927) evidence obtained by state officers by illegal search
and seizure was declared inadmissible where state officers, though not acting
in concert with federal agents, apparently believed that they were required
to aid in enforcing the National Prohibition Act. In Byars v. United States,
273 U.S. 28 (1927), evidence was held inadmissible where a federal agent
participated with state officers in illegal search and seizure.
23. The court may well have been considering the attitude of Brandeis, J.,
who, in his dissent in Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 423 (1927), said:
"I am aware that courts-mistaking relative social values and forgetting that
a desirable end cannot justify foul means-have, in their zeal to punish,
sanctioned the use of evidence obtained through criminal violation of prop-
erty and personal rights or by other practices of detectives even more re-
volting. But the objection here is of a different nature. It does not rest
merely upon the character of the evidence or upon the fact that evidence was
illegally obtained. The obstacle to the prosecution lies in the fact that the
alleged crime was instigated by officers of the Government; that the act for
which the Government seeks to punish the defendant is the fruit of their
criminal conspiracy to induce its commission."
24. 237 F.2d at 176.
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for a new trial contending that it was improper to submit loss of
profits for the jury's consideration in determining the amount of
damages. Held, motion denied. In view of the fact that such engines
could not be bought on the open market, loss of profits was a proper
consideration for the jury in determining the amount of damages.
De Rose v. Hunter Lindsay Corp., 41 N.J. Super. 178, 124 A.2d 349
(County Ct. 1956).
The damages recoverable for a breach of warranty include all
damages within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the
making of the contract1 or all loss directly and naturally resulting
from the breach.2 In the absence of special circumstances showing
proximate damage of greater amount, the measure of damages for
breach of warranty of quality is the difference between the actual
value of the defective goods and their value as warranted. 3 If the
purchaser is able to prove special circumstances, however, additional
damages may be recovered,4 including loss of profits caused by the
breach.5 It has been held that the purchase of goods for a specific
purpose or use, known to the seller, is such a special circumstance as
will entitle the buyer to recover for loss of profits.6 Thus, where the
seller knows that the goods are to be used in the buyer's business in
such a way that if defective they might alienate the buyer's customers,
the buyer may recover for loss of prospective profits or injury to his
business if such loss occurs.7 Also, where defective goods are pur-
l. Dushane v. Benedict, 120 U.S. 630 (1887); Grupe v. Glick, 26 Cal. 2d 680,
160 P.2d 832 (1945); McLachlan v. Wilmington Dry Goods Co., 41 Del. (2
Terry) 378, 22 A.2d 851 (1941).
2. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 69(6). This provision has been adopted, substan-
tially as proposed, by approximately 35 states. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE §
1789(6) (Deering 1949); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:30-75 (1940); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 47-1269 (1956). This rule would seem to include the contemplation test:
"If the injury is one that follows the breach in the usual course of events,
there is sufficient reason for the defendant to foresee it .... ", RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 330 (1932), followed as to damages for breach of warranty in
Kornblau v. McDermant, 90 Conn. 624, 98 Atl. 587 (1916); Johnson v. Waisman
Bros., 93 N.H. 133, 36 A.2d 634 (1944).
3. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 69(7). Some courts allow only the difference be-
tween the actual value and the contract price. Berry Asphalt Co. v. Apex
Oil Products Co., 215 Minn. 198, 9 N.W.2d 437 (1943); Dunck Tank Works,
Inc. v. Sutherland, 236 Wis. 83, 294 N.W. 510 (1940).
4. Expenses or losses incurred in the purchase and use of a defective arti-
cle: Hubshman v. Louis Keer Shoe Co., 129 F.2d 137 (7th Cir. 1942); Hud-
son Rug Refinishing & Cleaning Corp. v. Prime Mfg. Co., 115 F.2d 615 (7th
Cir. 1940). The cost of repairing the defective article: Moss v. Yount, 296 Ky.
415, 177 S.W.2d 372 (1944). The cost of avoiding loss: K. B. Noble Co. v.
Popielarczyk, 125 Conn. 699, 8 A.2d 33 (1939).
5. Hubshman v. Louis Keer Shoe Co., supra note 4; Suryan v. Lake Wash-
ington Shipyards, 163 Wash. 164, 300 Pac. 941 (1931).
6. Schaefer v. Fiedler, 116 Ind. App. 226, 63 N.E.2d 310 (1945); Excello
Hosiery Mills v. Hirch, 117 N.J. Eq. 570, 177 Atl. 96, (Ch.), aff'd, 119 N.J. Eq.
89, 180 Atl. 881 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935); American Oil Pump Co. v. Foust, 128
Ore. 263, 274 Pac. 322 (1929).
7. Rudolph Wurtlizer Co. v. Kaufman-Straus Co., 273 Ky. 149, 116 S.W.2d
305 (1938); Swain v. Schieffelin, 134 N.Y. 471, 31 N.E. 1025 (1892); Jones v.
Holland Furnace Co., 188 Wis. 394, 206 N.W. 57 (1925). But see Henry Porter
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chased specifically to fill a resale contract the purchaser may recover
the loss of profit he would have made on the resale.8 The courts have
been somewhat slow in allowing loss of profits allegedly caused by
defective machinery purchased for use in the buyer's business.9 Some
courts have held, however, that where the seller knows that the
machine is to be used in a profit making enterprise, loss of profits may
be recovered. 10 Other courts feel that the buyer must go further and
show that the defective article could not have been easily replaced in
the open market."
Refusing to accept defendant's contention that the "difference in
value" rule set out in the New Jersey Sales Act 12 was the exclusive
measure of damages in the instant case, the court held that this rule
was merely complementary to the more general rule.13 No error was
found in submitting evidence to the jury as to the loss of profits; and
the charge given to the jury-that "loss of profits was an element of
damages if within the contemplation of the parties"' 4 -was upheld.
This holding was seemingly based upon the fact that there was no
open market in new marine engines. Concerning this the court stated,
"If there is no open market for him to replace the goods by purchase
he should be permitted to recover the loss which directly and naturally
resulted from the breach. . ... 5s The court implied that in these
& Co. v. Lacy, 268 Ky. 666, 105 S.W.2d 818 (1937); Moran v. Standard Oil Co.,
211 N.Y. 187, 195, 105 N.E. 217, 220 (1914).
8. Friedman v. Tamargo, 171 N.Y. Supp. 171, (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1918); Trigg
v. Clay, 88 Va. 330, 13 S.E. 434 (1891). But where, the goods are purchased
only for resale in the future, loss of the contingent profits is not allowed.
Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Griffith, 43 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1930); Anderson
Trading Co. v. Brody, 205 App. Div. 47, 199 N.Y. Supp. 128 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
If the buyer actually resells the goods without discovering the defect and has
to make good to the purchaser on the resale, the original buyer may recover
for loss of profits. Grupe v. Glick, 26 Cal. 2d 680, 160 P.2d 832 (1945); Parker
v. Shaghalian & Co., 244 Mass. 19, 138 N.E. 236 (1923).
9. The courts have denied recovery on several grounds. See, e.g., Consolidated
Phosphate Co. v. B. F. Sturtevant Co., 20 Ga. App. 474, 93 S.E. 115 (1917)
(too remote and contingent); Henry Porter & Co. v. Lacy, 268 Ky. 666, 105
S.W.2d 818 (1937) (too remote); Lalime & Patridge, Inc. v. Hobbs, 255 Mass.
189, 151 N.E. 59 (1926) (not within the contemplation of the parties). In gen-
eral, see Annot., 32 A.L.R. 120 (1924).
10. Hubshman v. Louis Keer Shoe Co., 129 F.2d 137 (7th Cir. 1942); Excello
Hosiery Mills v. Hirch, 117 N.J. Eq. 570, 177 At. 96, (Ch.), aff'd, 119 N.J. Eq. 89,
180 Atl. 881 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935); American Oil Pump Co. v. Foust, 128 Ore.
263, 274 Pac. 322 (1929); Suryan v. Lake Washington Shipyards, 163 Wash.
164, 300 Pac. 941 (1931).
11. Grupe v. Glick, 26 Cal. 2d 680, 160 P.2d 832 (1945); Meyer v. Rottenberg,
168 N.Y. Supp. 630 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1918). See also Morello v. Growers Grape
Products Ass'n, 82 Cal. App. 2d 365, 186 P.2d 463 (1947) (breach of contract).
12. "In the case of breach of warranty of quality, such loss, in the absence
of special circumstances showing proximate damage of a greater amount, is
the difference between the value of goods at the time of delivery to the buyer
and the value they would have had if they had answered to the warranty."
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:30-75(7) (1940).
13. "The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the loss directly
and naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of events, from the breach of
warranty." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:30-75(6) (1940).
14. 124 A.2d at 350, 351.
15. Id. at 351.
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circumstances loss of profits naturally and directly resulted from
the breach and was, therefore, recoverable.
While some language in the opinion might indicate the mere fact
that defendant knew the engine was to be used in a profitable enter-
prise would entitle the plaintiff to recover lost profits,16 it is believed
that the absence of an open market is the true basis for the holding.
Such a holding is justified, for if a substitute engine could not have
been obtained in the open market the loss of profits seems to flow di-
rectly and naturally from the breach itself.17
FEDERAL COURTS-CHOICE OF LAW-APPLICATION OF
ERIE DOCTRINE TO DIVERSITY CASES INVOLVING
FEDERAL COMMERCIAL PAPER
United States bearer bonds held by plaintiff disappeared and were
subsequently cashed by defendant bank upon presentation by in-
dividual defendant. In a federal court action with jurisdiction based
upon diversity of citizenship the principal issue was the good faith of
defendants in accepting the bonds. The court instructed the jury,
in accordance with the common law of the state in which it sat, that
the burden of proving good faith was on defendants. On certiorari
from the decision of the court of appeals reversing the trial court on
the ground that federal rather than state law should have been ap-
plied,' held (7-2), reversed. In diversity cases involving United States
commercial paper, state law should be applied in litigation between
private parties not concerning the rights and duties of the federal
government. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell,
352 U.S. 29 (1956).
The Rules of Decision Act of 17892 requires a federal district
16. In many of the cases which purport to support this view, a closer look
at the facts will reveal other facts which could constitute "special circum-
stances." Hubshman v. Louis Keer Shoe Co., 129 F.2d 137 (7th Cir. 1942) (It
would seem from the facts that no one else would manufacture the shoes, so
there was no open market); Suryan v. Lake Washington Shipyards, 163
Wash. 164, 300 Pac. 941 (1931) (Another boat would have had to have been
built, and by that time the loss of profits would have occurred. The court
only allowed recovery for loss of profits while the boat was being repaired.)
17. Does saying that loss of profits cannot be recovered if a substitute for
the defective article can be obtained on the open market mean the same as
saying that loss of profits is a proper measure of damages if there is no open
market? See cases cited note 11 supra.
1. 226 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1955). The court of appeals felt that the case was
controlled by Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
See note 12 infra.
2. "The laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties,
or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be re-
garded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the Courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply." REV. STAT. § 721 (1875) (later
amended by 62 STAT. 944 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1652 (1950)). The Act was
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court, in appropriate cases, to apply the laws of the state in which
it sits. It was originally held that the Act applied only to state statu-
tory law as construed by state courts,3 with a tendency later develop-
ing to require application of well established lines of state court de-
cisions which had become local "rules of property."4 Since Erie v.
Tompkins,5 however, federal courts have been required to apply
all state "substantive"6 common law in diversity cases. The under-
recognized as declaratory of a rule that was binding upon the federal courts
without action by Congress. Thus federal equity courts also followed state
statutes of substantive law although the Act was by its terms applicable
only to "trials at common law." See Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy,
66 HARv. L. REV. 1013, 1027-31 (1953). For a thorough discussion of the legis-
lative history of the Act, see Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49, 51-52, 81-88, 108 (1923).
3. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). "In the ordinary use of
language, it will hardly be contended, that the decisions of courts constitute
laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are, and are not,
of themselves, laws. They are often re-examined, reversed and qualified by
the courts themselves.... The laws of a state are more usually understood
to mean the rules and enactments promulgated by the legislative authority
thereof, or long-established local customs having the force of laws." Id.
at 17 (opinion by Story, J.). Justice Story conceived of a "national common
law," especially a "general commercial law," to be applied by the federal
courts in situations not covered by state statutes or well-established local
custom. For a defense of this doctrine, see Parker, The Common Law Juris-
diction of the United States Courts, 17 YALE L.J. 1 (1907). For a pre-Erie
survey of the scope of the doctrine, see Sharp and Brennan, The Application of
the Doctrine of Swift v. Tyson Since 1900, 4 IND. L.J. 367 (1929).
4. See Dooley v. Pease, 180 U.S. 126 (1901).
.5. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This case expressly overruled Swift v. Tyson and ap-
pears to declare that the decision of the Supreme Court in that case was "un-
constitutional." How can a judicial decision be unconstitutional when it
does not purport to create "law" for the future but merely operates ex
post facto to declare the rights, duties and liabilities of the parties before it
arising out of a past event or transaction? Compare the concurring opinion
of Justice Reed. Id. at 90. The decision in the Erie case was foreshadowed
by two earlier dissenting opinions of Justice Holmes criticizing Story's
conception of a "national common law." "If there were such a transcendental
body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it ... the
Courts of the United States might be right in using their independent
judgment as to what it was. But there is no such body of law.... [L]aw in
the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite
authority behind it. The common law so far as it is enforced in a State ...
is not the common law generally but the law of that State existing by the
authority of that State without regard to what it may have been in England
or anywhere else." Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533-34 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Holmes'
dissenting opinion in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 370 (1910).
Justice Brandeis, writing for the majority in the Erie decision, quotes Holmes
with approval but fails to point out that Holmes was dissenting from the
application of the Swift doctrine in a situation of such a local nature that even
Story would doubtless have agreed it should be governed by state law.
Justice Reed, concurring in Erie, does point out that Holmes did not advocate
the abrogation of Swift v. Tyson. The Court also appears to have been
greatly influenced by the new evidence of the legislative intent in enacting the
Rules of Decision Act which was revealed in Warren, supra note 2.
6. The line of demarcation between "substantive" and "procedural" law
is notoriously impossible of precise location. It is a general principle of con-
flict of laws that a court will apply its own procedural law while choosing
the substantive law of some other state. But this rule does not locate the
line; it merely tells the court what to do after the line is located. There is
still much disagreement as to whether a particular rule of law is substantive
or procedural, and as yet no satisfactory a priori test has been developed.
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lying policy of the Erie decision is that the results of cases which
would have been brought in state courts except for the accident of
diversity should not be substantially different in the federal courts.
7
As a consequence of this policy, the Erie doctrine has been extended
to state rules of law, such as those governing the allocation of the
burden of persuasion,8 which are normally classed as "procedural"'
but which are nevertheless "outcome determinative."'1 The Court
apparently refuses, however, to extend the Erie rule to non-diversity
cases since the reason for the rule is absent."
In Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,2 a non-diversity case in-
volving federal commercial paper, the United States sued to recover
the proceeds of a government check collected by defendant, to whom
the check had been negotiated by forged indorsement. The Supreme
Court held that the Erie rule was inapplicable and that the district
court had erred in instructing the jury, in accordance with state law,
that recovery by the United States would be barred if it had delayed
an unreasonable time in notifying defendant of the forgery. The
Court did not mention the fact that this was a non-diversity case but
stated that, for the sake of uniformity, the rights and duties of the.
federal government on its own commercial paper should not be con-
trolled by state law.
13
Furthermore, what is procedural in the conflict of laws sense may well be
called substantive, and vice versa, in other situations, as, for example, in
determining the constitutionality of an ex post facto statute.
7. This broad policy is nowhere expressed in the Erie decision. It appears to
have been given its first judicial expression by Judge Magruder in Sampson v.
Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940).
8. For an explanation of how rules allocating the burden of ]persuasion
are "outcome determinative," see Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof,
58 HARV. L. REV. 153, 182-85 (1944).
9. Le., "procedural" in the conflict of laws sense. See note 5 supra.
10. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (statute of
limitations). Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the
federal courts were required by statute to apply state procedural rules. See
Conformity Act of 1872, 17 STAT. 197. The Federal Rules were adopted with
the aim of achieving the greatest possible uniformity of practice and pro-
cedure throughout the federal court system. For a criticism of the encroach-
ment of "creeping Erieism" upon the domain of the Federal Rules by find-
ing rules of procedure to be "outcome determinative," see Merrigan, Erie
to York to Ragan-A Triple Play on the Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV.
711 (1950). See also Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Substance" and
"Procedure" After Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REv. 271 (1939).
11. Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953) (statute of limitations in
admiralty case); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946) (statute of
limitations where jurisdiction based on federal question). See D'Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 466 (1942) (concurring opinion). Despite
the broad judicial declarations that Erie is inapplicable in non-diversity
cases, there appear to be possible collateral effects of Erie in this area. See
Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARv. L.
R;V. 66 (1955).
12. 318 U.S. 363 (1943). The basis for federal jurisdiction was the fact that
the United States was plaintiff. See 62 STAT. 933 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1345
(1950).
13. "In our choice of the applicable federal rule we have occasionally se-
lected state law ... But reasons which may make state law at times the ap-
propriate federal rule are singularly inappropriate here. The issuance of
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The instant case is a diversity action involving the rights and duties
of private litigants on federal commercial paper. The rule of law in
question-the allocation of the burden of persuasion-while not sub-
stantive in the usual sense is nevertheless "outcome determinative."
The issue presented was whether the Clearfield policy of uniformity
should be extended or whether the case should be controlled by Erie.
The majority chose to distinguish Clearfield and follow Erie, while
a minority felt that the desirability of uniformity was equally great
here as in Clearfield.
From the standpoint of the underlying policy of Erie there is noth-
ing surprising or illogical about the holding of the instant case, as a
contrary decision would have allowed the accident of diversity to
alter substantially the outcome of the case. Nor was the holding in-
consistent with a strict interpretation of the Clearfield decision, as
the rights and duties of the United States were not directly in issue.
But it remains to be seen whether the Court will choose federal or
state law in a diversity case directly involving the obligations of the
federal government on its own commercial paper.14 The decision of
the instant case enhances the probability that in such a situation
Clearfield will prevail.15 If Erie is to be abandoned in that situation,
should it not also have been abandoned in the instant case? It may
not always be a simple matter to determine whether the obligations of
the United States are directly in issue. In the words of the dissenting
opinion, "the uncertainties which inhere in such a dichotomy are
obvious.'
16
TORTS-BATTERY-CONSENT OF MINOR TO SIMPLE
OPERATION AS A DEFENSE
Plaintiff, an eighteen year old girl, sought to recover damages for
an alleged battery committed by the defendant physician in perform-
commercial paper by the United States is on a vast scale and transactions in
that paper from issuance to payment will commonly occur in several states.
The application of state law . . .would subject the rights and duties of the
United States to exceptional uncertainty .... The desirability of a uniform
rule is plain." 318 U.S. at 367. The Court looked to the "federal law merchant,
developed ... under the regime of Swift v. Tyson," for the "choice of a fed-
eral rule designed to protect a federal right." Ibid. Was Holmes' statement, or,
more accurately, the interpretation in Erie of his statement, that there could
be no "national common law" correct? Is any system of common law any more
than a "convenient source of reference" from which to choose rules by which
rights are to be protected? Must the federal courts choose rules from this
source only when protecting "federal rights?"
14. Such a situation appears entirely possible. For example, the validity
of federal commercial paper might be in issue in a diversity case; the United
States or an agency thereof might even be joined as a party.
15. The instant case reaffirms the Clearfield policy of uniformity of result
where the obligations of the Government are involved.
16. 352 U.S. at 35.
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ing an operation on her nose. The trial court refused to admit testi-
mony that plaintiff had consented to the operation, and instructed the
jury that the defendant had committed a technical battery by perform-
ing the operation without the consent of the parents.' The Court of
Appeals reversed on the grounds that the refusal to admit the testi-
mony of defendant and the charged to the jury were erroneous. On
appeal to the supreme court, heZd, affirmed. The consent of an infant
to a simple operation will be effective if she is capable of understand-
ing and appreciating the consequences thereof.2 Lacey v. Laird, 139
N.E.2d 25 (Ohio 1956).
In the absence of exceptional circumstances, 3 an operation or other
invasion of the person by a physician is a technical battery, regardless
of the results, and is excusable only where there is express or implied
consent by the patient.4 If, however, the patient is incapable of giving
consent because of infancy, intoxication or mental incompetence,5
his manifestation of consent will not protect the physician; and the
consent of the parent, guardian or other person standing in a like
position must be obtained.6 There are two views on whether infancy
will render the patient incapable of giving consent. Under the strict
view, the mere fact of infancy will render the consent of the patient
ineffective, and the physician must secure the consent of the parent
or other person standing in loco parentis to the patient in order to
be relieved of liability.? The basis for this view seems to be that
1. The trial court, in answering a question submitted by the jury, also
stated that plaintiff could recover nominal damages for the technical battery
and that nominal damages ranged from a nominal amount to $25,000, the
prayer of the complaint. This was also held erroneous by the appellate court.
2. The opinion was per curiam. Four of the justices concurred m this state-
ment of the law. Three of the justices were of the opinion that the mere fact
of infancy rendered the consent ineffective, but concurred as to the result on
the ground that the trial court's statement to the jury concerning damages
was erroneous.
3. It has been held that in cases of emergency, when an operation is ob-
viously necessary for the preservation of life or limb of the patient, consent
of the patient is implied. However, the emergency must exist at the time
of the operation, and it is not sufficient that the diseased condition would
endanger the plaintiff's health or life in the future. Tabor v. Scobee, 254
S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1951). See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir.
1941) for an excellent discussion of this problem.
4. Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905); Annots., 76 A.L.R.
562 (1932), 139 A.L.R. 1370 (1942). The common-law maxim is volenti non
fit injuria-to one who consents, no wrong is done. Consent to an act is willing-
ness that it should be done, and actual consent to the conduct of the defendant
will prevent liability. The defendant is also entitled to rely upon what a
reasonable man would understand from the plaintiff's conduct, and consent
may be implied therefrom. It should be noted that in the field of negligence
the principle that to one who consents no wrong is done is given effect in
the doctrine of assumption of risk, which relieves the defendant of the obliga-
tion to exercise care. PRossER, TORTS § 18 (2d ed. 1955).
5. Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906) (mental incompetence);
McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex. 168 (1883) (intoxication).
6. PROSSER, TORTS § 18 (2d ed. 1955).
7. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (15 years old); Zoski v.
Gaines, 271 Mich. 1, 260 N.W. 99 (1935) (9Y years old); Rogers v. Sells, 178
Okla. 103, 61 P.2d 1018 (1936) (14 years old). But cf. Bakker v. Welsh, 144
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common experience has shown minors to be incapable of making
intelligent decisions, and public policy demands that they be pro-
tected.8 Under the second view, expressed in the Restatement of
Torts,9 the effectiveness of the consent of a minor is dependent upon
his actual capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of
the operation 0 This latter view takes into account the seriousness of
the operation and the age and mental capacity of the youth, but re-
fuses to apply an arbitrary rule to every case.
In the instant case the majority of the court adopted the Restatement
view, whereas the minority took the strict view. The reasoning be-
hind the two opinions, however, seems relatively novel. The majority
opinion refused to analogize capacity of a minor to consent to an in-
tentional tort with capacity of a minor to contract;" instead, they
relied upon the closer analogy of a minor being denied recovery in
a negligence action by assumption of the risk.12 The minority, on the
other hand, contended that the "strict" view is not based upon the
incapacity of a minor to consent, so far as he is personally concerned,
but rather upon the right of the parents whose liability for support
and maintenance of their child may be greatly increased by an un-
favorable result from the operation. It is their view that strangers
should not be permitted to interfere with the parent-child relationship
Mich. 632, 108 N.W. 94 (1906) (17 years old). Later Michigan cases are said
to modify this case. See Zoski v. Gaines, supra.
8. "In deference to common experience, there is general recognition of the
fact that many persons by reason of their youth are incapable of intelligent
decision, as the result of which public policy demands legal protection of
their personal as well as their property rights." Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d
121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (court refused to use the Restatement rule, reason-
ing from the analogy of contract liability, the statutory age of consent of
females and the legal age of marriage).
9. "(1) If a person whose interest is invaded is at the time by reason of
his youth or defective mental condition, whether permanent or tem-
porary, incapable of understanding or appreciating the consequences of
the invasion, the assent of such person to the invasion is not effective as
a consent thereto.
"(2) The assent of a parent, guardian or other person standing in
like relation to one described in subsection (1) has the same effect as
though given by the person whose interest is invaded, if such parent,
guardian or other person has the power to consent to the invasion."
RFESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 59 (1934).
10. Gulf & S.I.R.R. v. Sullivan, 155 Miss. 1, 119 So. 501 (1928) (17 years
old). Cf. Bishop v. Shurly, 237 Mich. 76, 211 N.W. 75 (1926) (19 years old);
Bakker v. Welsh, 144 Mich. 632, 108 N.W. 94 (1906) (said to be modified by
later Michigan decisions).
11. The majority reasoned that the consent contemplated by the maxim
volenti non fit injuria is not dependent upon the contractual capacity of the
person who gives consent. 139 N.E.2d at 32. The opinion also pointed out
the legal absurdities to which the "strict" view could lead: any boy who
kisses a girl under 21 with her consent but without her parents' consent
would thereby expose himself to liability to an action for assault and battery,
and every high school football player would run the risk of assault and
battery actions by boys under 21 with or against whom he played. 139 N.E.2d
at 34.
12. Porter v. Toledo Terminal R.R., 152 Ohio St. 463, 90 N.E.2d 142 (1950)
(13 year old held to have assumed the risk in a tort action).
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or with matters touching the personal welfare of the child.13
The desirability of laying down an arbitrary rule to govern all cases
of this nature is questionable. Indeed, situations will arise in which
the application of the "strict" rule would be unjust and inequitable,
and courts which purport to follow this rule appear under certain
circumstances to create exceptions in order to avoid inequitable re-
sults.14 The Restatement view seems to be more desirable, allowing
the court to look into the peculiar facts of each case and to determine
if the consent of the minor should be given effect. By adopting this
view the courts may avoid much legal doubletalk and irreconcilable
conflicts in their own decisions, and will establish a definite legal
standard by which the effectiveness of the consent of a minor may be
established.
TORTS-DUTY TO ACT-EMPLOYER'S ASSUMPTION OF A
DUTY BY GIVING MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS TO EMPLOYEES
In the course of a medical examination given all employees, the
defendant-employer found that the plaintiff suffered from arrested
tuberculosis. Plaintiff, however, was not informed of his ailment.
After this condition became disabling, the plaintiff brought an action
based on the negligent failure of defendant to disclose the tubercular
condition, contending that reliance on the defendant's silence delayed
his discovery and treatment. The district court granted relief. Held,
affirmed. Employer's failure to notify employee of tuberculosis dis-
covered in the course of a required examination, resulting In a
worsening of employee's condition through his reliance on the em-
ployer's silence, constitutes actionable negligence. Union Carbide &
Carbon Corp. v. Stapleton, 237 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1956).
Historically the law imposes no requirement that one should act
affirmatively in aid of another, basing the absence of responsibility
to another upon the reasoning that no legal duty exists between the
parties.' From an early time the harshness of this position has im-
pressed the courts, resulting in at least two fairly well defined ex-
13. 139 N.E.2d at 30.
14. Where the parents of the infant are so remote as to make impractical
the obtaining of their consent in time to accomplish the proper results, or
where the child is close to maturity, exceptional circumstances which would
justify the surgeon in accepting the child's consent are said to exist. See the
discussion in Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941). It seems
probable that the same result would have been reached in all of these cases
had the court applied the Restatement view. Note that the "strict?' view cases
almost invariably deal with young children, while the Restatement view
cases deal with older children. See notes 7 & 10 supra.
1. PROSSER, TORTS § 38(c) (2d ed. 1955); Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid
Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REv. 217 (1908).
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ceptions in which liability for failing to aid another is recognized.2
The first of these predicates liability upon the breach of a duty which
arises from the creation of a 8pecified relationship between the parties.
This relationship must be one in which a party is dependent upon
another, and out of Which a duty to render affirmative aid may be
said to flow. Fundamental examples of such duties are those of a
patent to aid her child,3 of a shipowner to attempt to rescue a sailor
lost overboard,4 of a common carrier to care for an injured passenger,5
and of an employer to aid an employee, at least Where the work is
dangerous, 6 or done in an isolated area.7 This duty is directly ilherent
in the relationship, and arises only in regard to those incidents having
a vital bearing upon the dependent or fiduciary nature of the rela-
tionship.8
A second exception engrafted upon the rule that one has no affirm-
ative duty to aid another is recognized where one has already under-
taken to act. In this instance, the law imposes a dtity to continue to
act with due care,9 or at least not to worsen the situation.10 This duty
arises despite the purely gratuitdus nature of the undertaking. The
duty is traceable, perhaps, to the same doctrine underlying the first
exception in that the assistor's aid to an injured person creates a
dependent relationship between the two," btt it is now recognized
2. HARPER, TORTS § 79 (1933); McNiece and Thornton, Affirmative Duties in
Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272 (1949).
3. In re Ten Hoopen's Custody, 202 N.C. 223, 162 S.E. 619 (1932) (parent has
a legal duty to protect children).
4. Harris v. Pentsylvania R.R., 50 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1931) (shipowner
liable for failure of crew to aid seaman who fell overboard through his own
negligence.).
5, Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. Byrd, 89 Miss. 308, 42 So. 286 (1906) (railroad liable
for failure to furnish aid to passenger injured by his own negligence).
6. Ittnicke v. Meramec Quarry Co., 262 Mo. 560, 172 S.W. 43 (1914) (em-
ployer liable for failure to furnish medical aid to employee injured so badly
that he was unable to look out for himself); RESTATEMENT, AGEcY § 512,
comments b,c (1933).
7. Schumaker v. St. Paul & D.R.R., 46 Minn. 39, 48 N.W. 559 (1891) (leaving
plaintiff-employee in open country at night in cold weather, a long distance
from food or shelter is actionable negligence); RESTATEMTENT, AdExcV § 512,
comments b,c (1933).
8. A saloonkeeper has no legal duty to protect customers health; but once
a customer has become unconscious through drinking, such duty does atise.
Weymire v. Wolfe, 52 Iowa 533, 3 N.W. 541 (1879).
9. A landlord who gratuitously undertakes to make repairs to the tenants
premises must do so with due care. Olsen v. Mading, 45 Ariz. 423, 45 P.2d
23 (1935); Bartlett v. Taylor, 351 Mo. 1060, 174 S.W.2d 844 (1943). See
PROssEm, TORTS § 38(c) (2d. ed, 1955).
10. Some courts hold that there is no liability where the situation is not
made worse by the volunteer's act. Erie R.R. v. Stewart, 40 F.2d 855 (6th Cir.
1930) (railroad which voluntarily kept watchman at a crossing to Warn of
approaching trains is liable for failure to do so only if injured motorist knew
of and relied on the watchman's presence); Therrien v. First Nat'l Stores,
Inc., 63 R.I. 44, 6 A.2d 731 (1939) (owner who only partially cleaned snow
from sidewalk is not liable to injured customer since his act did not make
the street more dangerous). See RtSTATEmtNT, TORTS §§ 323-24 (1934).
11. McNiece and Thornton, supra note 2 at 1286.
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as an entirely separate duty.' 2 A salient point of distinction is that
the relationship duty inheres in the incidents of the relationship,
while a duty to act after having undertaken aid arises initially at the
time of rendering aid, and not before.
The holding in the instant case may be explained as an application
of either type of duty. Examined from the viewpoint of the first-
that certain affirmative duties arise from a specified relationship be-
tween the parties-the employment relationship may be considered
as containing an inherent duty to act. Ordinarily this is a relationship
recognized as one upon which duties to act affirmatively may be im-
posed. Among these are the generally recognized duties of the em-
ployer to provide safe tools 13 and to notify the employee of patently
dangerous defects in the premises,14 and of the employer to act in
aid of a workman injured in the course of his employment. 15 In order
to found liability upon failure of the employer to notify the employee
of his ailment, it must be determined that the taking of the medical
examination was an actual incident of the employment relationship;
and, as such, that the special circumstances of the relationship made
it so vital thereto as to give rise to an affirmative duty to act. It
is suggested that because the examination was taken primarily for
the employer's benefit it is not an important incident of the relation-
ship.
A less tenuous approach for imposing liability is to say that in
undertaking to act in the first instance the defendant was thereby
charged with the duty to continue to act affirmatively. Giving a
physical examination may be said to constitute an undertaking to
warn the defendant of bad health, creating a duty which was not
discharged. The foible is whether the defendant undertook to per-
form an act for the benefit of the employee.16 Further, even if
12. Justice Holmes clearly distinguished the two in 1894. Riley v. Lissner,
160 Mass. 330, 35 N.E. 1130 (1894) (landlord is not liable as landlord but as
a volunteer when he negligently replaces manhole cover on tenant's sewer);
McLeod v. Rawson, 215 Mass. 257, 102 N.E. 429 (1913) (defendant, wife of land-
lord, volunteered to furnish light to plaintiff and was liable for failure to
do so).
13. Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Sawusch, 218 Ill. 130, 75 N.E. 797 (1905)
(employer liable when faulty control handle on trolley caused one employee
to injure another).
14. Daly v. Kiel, 106 La. 170, 30 So. 254 (1901). But no warning of obvious
dangers is necessary. Chicago & A. Ry. v. Bell, 209 Ill. 25, 70 N.E. 754 (1904).
The court in the instant case seemed to use this as a major premise in placing
liability on the employer. When the danger is in the premises, the courts stress
the fact that the employer has superior knowledge and control of the premises.
Is the situation the same where the danger lies within the employee? If it is
then it would seem likely that the employer would be liable if he discovered
the disease incidentally without the aid of medical examination.
15. Hunicke v. Meramec Quarry Co., 262 Mo. 560, 172 N.W. 43 (1914) (Em-
ployer liable for failure to furnish medical aid to employee injured so badly
that he was unable to look out for himself); Troutman's Adm'r v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 179 Ky. 145, 200 S.W. 488 (1918). Contra, Voorhees v. New York Cent.
R.R., 129 App. Div. 780, 114 N.Y. Supp. 242 (4th Dep't 1909).
16. From the reported opinion it appears that there was a conversation
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the conduct of the defendant in fact would have benefited the plain-
tiff, the doctrine does not clearly determine whether the defendant
need have an intent to aid the plaintiff or simply a conscious aware-
ness that the plaintiff depends on the continuing of his aid.
Either basis of liability could reasonably have been utilized in the
instant case; but inasmuch as these two duties arise at different times
for distinctly different reasons, an attempt to merge the two weakens
the authority of both.17
between the physician and employee concerning the condition of the em-
ployee's lungs, which would indicate some intent to inform the employee of
his physical condition. 237 F.2d at 231.
17. It is apparent, however, that the employment relationship is the deter-
minative factor in the court's judgment, indicating a further amplification
of the employer's responsibility to his employee. This appears to be the
orthodox approach used by the courts in dealing with cases involving both a
special relationship and a gratuitous undertaking. It is difficult to see why
all volunteers should not be treated the same regardless of whether the
volunteer was motivated by a special relationship. Possibly the existence of
the relationship would have some bearing on whether or not the aided person
was contributorily negligent.
In Glidden v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 143 Me. 24, 54 A.2d 528 (1947),
23 IND. L.J. 343 (1948), where the facts were similar to those in the instant
case, the court held that the employer had a duty to inform an employee of a
bad heart condition only if the employer knew that the employee was ignorant
of his condition. The mere fact that the employer knew that the employee
probably didn't know his condition was not sufficient. The court held that
the plaintiff must plead and prove actual knowledge. There was no mention
made of undertaking to do a gratuitous act.
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